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Abstract. Supply chains are becoming more complex and vulnerable due to 
globalization and interdependency between different risks. Existing studies 
have focused on identifying different preventive and reactive strategies for 
mitigating supply chain risks and advocating the need for adopting specific 
strategy under a particular situation. However, current research has not 
addressed the issue of evaluating an optimal mix of preventive and reactive 
strategies taking into account their relative costs and benefits within the supply 
network setting of interconnected firms and organizations. We propose a new 
modelling approach of evaluating different combinations of such strategies 
using Bayesian belief networks. This technique helps in determining an optimal 
solution on the basis of maximum improvement in the network expected loss. 
We have demonstrated our approach through a simulation study and discussed 
practical and managerial implications. 
Keywords: Supply chain risks; Preventive and reactive strategies; Bayesian be-
lief networks; Network expected loss; Simulation study 
1 Introduction 
Supply chains have become complex because of the globalization and outsourcing in 
manufacturing industries. Supply chain risk is characterized by both the probability of 
an event and its severity given that an event occurs. Supply chain risk management 
(SCRM) is an active area of research that deals with the overall management of risk 
events ranging across the entire spectrum of the supply chain including external risk 
IDFWRUV ³SCRM aims to identify the potential sources of supply chain risk and im-
SOHPHQWDSSURSULDWHDFWLRQVWRDYRLGRUFRQWDLQVXSSO\FKDLQYXOQHUDELOLW\´ [1]. Vul-
nerability is defined as an exposure to serious disturbances from risks within the sup-
ply chain as well as risks external to the supply chain [2]. Supply chain risk is an 
event that may cause disruption to the flow of activities within the supply chain. Re-
cently, there has been a shift in the interest of researchers towards exploring impact of 
disruption on global supply chains. Global sourcing and lean operations are the main 
drivers of supply chain disruptions [3]. 
Bayesian belief network (BBN) is a an acyclic directed graphical model comprising 
nodes representing uncertain variables and arcs indicating causal relationships be-
tween variables whereas the strength of dependency is represented by the conditional 
probability values. BBNs have started gaining the interest of researchers in modelling 
supply chain risks [4]. BBNs offer a unique feature of modelling risks combining both 
the statistical data and subjective judgment in case of non-availability of data [5]. 
Researchers have used the BBNs to model specific domains of supply chain risks and 
validated these models through case studies. 
1.1 Research Problem and Contribution 
It is extremely important to consider the interdependency between risks in modelling 
supply chain risks. However, capturing the probabilistic interaction between risks and 
resulting losses is not sufficient for managing risks as risk management process ne-
cessitates selecting cost-effective strategies. Selection of optimal mix of risk mitiga-
tion strategies has never been explored within the realm of interconnected risks across 
different segments of a supply network. This paper bridges the research gap and pre-
sents a new modelling approach of evaluating mix of preventive and reactive strate-
gies taking into account the supply network configuration, interdependency between 
risks and associated costs and benefits of different combinations of risk mitigation 
strategies. The technique will help researchers develop robust models of managing 
supply chain risks and benefit practitioners in understanding interaction between risks 
and selecting optimal mix of risk mitigation strategies. 
1.2 Outline 
We present brief overview of the research conducted in SCRM in Section 2. New 
modelling approach of evaluating risk mitigation strategies is described in Section 3. 
Application of the proposed method is demonstrated through a simulation study in 
Section 4. Furthermore, results are also discussed in detail followed by the explication 
of managerial implications. Finally, conclusion and future research agenda are pre-
sented in Section 5.  
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Supply Chain Risk Management 
Risk management is an established field in some areas of organizational life like fi-
nance but it is still a developing theme within the realm of Supply chain management 
[6]. Despite the ongoing debate on the objective and subjective nature of risk, there is 
a consensus among researchers on treating the risk management as a process compris-
ing three stages of risk identification, risk estimation and risk evaluation [7]³6&50
is the management of supply chain risks through coordination or collaboration 
DPRQJVWWKHVXSSO\FKDLQSDUWQHUVVRDVWRHQVXUHSURILWDELOLW\DQGFRQWLQXLW\´[8]. 
Simulation has been extensively used by researchers in modeling supply chain 
risks. It provides a systematic approach for understanding the interactive impact of 
factors for different scenarios. Simulation techniques used in the realm of supply 
chain risk management include agent-based modeling, Monte Carlo simulation, dis-
crete event simulation, system dynamics modeling and Petri-Net simulation [9]. Re-
searchers have also used mixed methods in their research. Analytical hierarchy pro-
cess has been considered as an effective technique for modelling and managing sup-
ply chain risks [10]. 
The major limitation of existing models is their lack of capturing the holistic nature 
of supply chain risks. Many techniques are not able to account for risk propagation 
[11]. Furthermore, existing methods and models have not taken into consideration the 
network configuration of a supply chain. The limited focus of these models in solving 
specific problems results in evaluating locally optimal solutions. BBNs present a use-
ful technique of capturing interaction between risk events and performance measures 
[4]. Another advantage of using BBNs for modelling supply chain risks is the ability 
of back propagation that helps in determining the probability of an event that may not 
be observed directly. There are certain problems associated with the use of BBNs. 
Firstly, with the increase in number of nodes representing supply chain risks, a con-
siderable amount of data is required in populating the network with (conditional) 
probability values and it might not be feasible to elicit huge data from the experts. 
Secondly, there are computational challenges associated with the increase in number 
of nodes. 
2.2 Bayesian Belief Network based Models 
Lockamy and McCormack [12] developed a model for benchmarking supplier risks 
incorporating risk events related to supplier network, internal operations and external 
factors. They used surveys and interviews for collection of data from both the internal 
and external company sources and applied the model on a group of 15 automotive 
casting suppliers for a major automotive company in US. Dogan and Aydin [13] de-
veloped a supplier selection model combining Total Cost of Ownership and BBN 
methods and applied the model in automotive industry to help Tier-1 suppliers select 
their own suppliers. They found the method to be suitable in dealing with incomplete 
or uncertain information of buyers about the suppliers.  
Badurdeen et al. [4] developed supply chain risk taxonomy and a risk network map 
capturing interdependencies between risks and applied the model on the Boeing 
company and its Tier 1 Suppliers. Their model presents an effective tool to capture 
the interaction of risk factors and helps in identifying key suppliers. Risk propagation 
across multiple tiers is not explored in their study. Furthermore, modelling of 
resulting losses and mitigation strategies with associated costs is not considered and 
therefore, risk management process is not explored through BBNs comprehensively. 
Garvey et al. [11] presented a Bayesian network approach of modelling risk propa-
gation in a supply network. Their proposed model takes into consideration the inter-
dependencies between risks and the structure of a supply network. They introduced 
different risk measures on the basis of this model and conducted a simulation study in 
order to demonstrate the use of risk measures in a supply network setting. However, 
evaluation of their proposed risk measures is not feasible in case of a complex net-
work structure. Furthermore, they did not focus on the risk evaluation stage of risk 
management process. 
2.3 Limitations and Research Gap 
Most of the existing studies in SCRM have focused on specific domains in supply 
chain without considering the holistic view. Qualitative techniques are not able to 
capture the interaction of risks exclusively whereas many quantification methods treat 
risks as independent [4], [13]. Limited studies have considered modelling interde-
pendency between risks and resulting losses. However, it is not sufficient to model the 
probabilistic interaction between risks and resulting losses. Risk evaluation is an 
equally important stage of the risk management process that necessitates evaluating 
the costs and benefits associated with different combinations of risk mitigation strate-
gies. Risk evaluation has gained limited attention of the researchers in SCRM and no 
study has focused on integrating the probabilistic interaction between risks, resulting 
losses and impact of mitigation strategies. It is, therefore, important to investigate an 
effective approach of not only assessing risks but also evaluating different mitigation 
strategies within a framework of interconnected risks and mitigation strategies.  
3 New Modelling Approach 
Based on the efficacy of BBNs in capturing interdependencies between risks, we con-
sider BBN based modeling of a supply network as an effective approach. Such a 
modeling technique can help managers visualize supply chain risks and take effective 
mitigation strategies [5], [9]. BBNs have been already explored in the literature of 
SCRM, however, our proposed BBN based modelling approach is unique in terms of 
introducing new risk measures that capture the impact of loss propagation across the 
entire network and demonstrating the efficacy of BBNs in evaluating risk mitigation 
strategies. 
3.1 Framework 
We follow the butterfly view of supply chain risks ranging from the causes to actual 
risk events to consequences [14]. Furthermore, we classify risks as process, upstream, 
downstream and external risks. Process risks relate to the risks directly associated 
with the main focal firm and comprise inventory, operational, quality and manage-
ment risks. Downstream and upstream risks arise from the interaction between the 
focal firm and its customers and suppliers respectively. External risks are driven by 
external events like weather, earthquakes, political and market forces [15]. Supply 
chain risks can be considered as an interconnected web of events spanning across the 
entire network as shown in Fig. 1.  
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3.2 Assumptions 
Our model is based on following assumptions: 
1. Entire structure of the supply network is known 
2. Risk triggers, events and consequences can be assigned to different locations and 
links between the locations and furthermore, all stakeholders agree to share such 
information 
3. All random variables are represented by binary states 
4. Conditional probability values and resulting losses can be elicited from the stake-
holders and the resulting Bayesian network represents close approximation to the 
actual perceived risks and interdependency between different risks 
5. Each mitigation strategy comprises three states including options of taking no ac-
tion, adopting preventive strategy and implementing reactive strategy 
6. Costs associated with the implementation of either strategy at important nodes are 
known 
3.3 Model and Risk Measures 
A discrete supply chain risk diagram ܰ ൌ ሺܺǡ ܩǡ ܲǡ ܮሻ is a four-tuple consisting of 
x a directed acyclic graph ሺܦܣܩሻ,ܩ ൌ ሺܸǡ ܧሻ, with nodes, ܸ, representing discrete 
risk events, ܺோ, discrete risk mitigation strategies, ௌܺ,  and loss functions, ܮ, and 
directed links, ܧ, encoding dependence relations 
x a set of conditional probability distributions, ܲ , containing a distribution, ܲሺܺோȁܺ௣௔ሺோሻሻ,  for each risk event, ܺோ 
x a set of loss functions, ܮ, containing one loss function, ݈ሺܺ௣௔ሺ௏ሻሻ, for each node ݒ 
in the subset ௟ܸ א ܸ of loss nodes. 
 ܧܮሺܺሻ ൌ  ? ܲሺܺ௩ȁܺ௣௔ሺ௩ሻሻ  ? ݈ሺܺ௣௔ሺ௪ሻሻ௪א௏ಽ௑ೡא௑ೃ  (1) 
where ܧܮሺܺሻis the expected loss across entire supply network 
Definitions. Following terms relate to the combination of risk mitigation strategies 
corresponding to two different configurations of the supply network: 
x Standard Configuration (SC). Supply network is considered to be in its standard 
configuration when risk mitigation strategies selected in the Bayesian network re-
flect real-time profile of these strategies in the supply network. 
x Contingency Configuration (CC). Supply network is considered to be in its contin-
gency configuration when the combination of risk mitigation strategies satisfies the 
objective function.  
Risk Measures. We introduce two risk measures in order to evaluate the relative 
contribution of each risk factor towards the loss propagation across entire network.  
x Loss Propagation Containment Measure (LPCM). Loss propagation containment 
measure is the ratio between relative improvement in the network expected loss 
corresponding to complete mitigation of the risk factor and network expected loss 
for the standard configuration. 
 ܮܲܥܯ௑ೃ೔ ൌ ா௅ሺ௑ሻିா௅ሺ௑ȁ௑ೃ೔ୀ௙௔௟௦௘ሻா௅ሺ௑ሻೄ಴  (2) 
 ܣݒ݃Ǥ ܮܲܥܯሺܮܲܥܯതതതതതതതതሻ ൌ  ?Ȁ  ݊? ܮܲܥܯ௑ೃ೔௡ଵ  (3) 
x Loss Propagation Spread Measure (LPSM). Loss propagation spread measure is 
the ratio between range of network expected loss corresponding to the two extreme 
states of the risk factor and network expected loss for the standard configuration. 
 ܮܲܵܯ௑ೃ೔ ൌ ா௅ሺ௑ȁ௑ೃ೔ୀ௧௥௨௘ሻିா௅ሺ௑ȁ௑ೃ೔ୀ௙௔௟௦௘ሻா௅ሺ௑ሻೄ಴  (4) 
 ܣݒ݃Ǥ ܮܲܵܯሺܮܲܵܯതതതതതതതതሻ ൌ  ?Ȁ  ݊? ܮܲܵܯ௑ೃ೔௡ଵ  (5) 
3.4 Modelling Process 
Following steps must be followed in developing the Bayesian network based model of 
a given supply network and evaluating the optimal combination of mitigation strate-
gies: 
1. Define the boundaries of supply network and identify stakeholders 
2. Following the supply network process flow, classify risks as triggers, risk events 
and consequences on the basis of input received from each stakeholder 
3. Refine the qualitative structure of the resulting network involving all stakeholders 
4. Elicit (conditional) probability values, loss values resulting from risks and costs as-
sociated with implementing different mitigation strategies and populate the Bayes-
ian network with all values 
5. Define the objective function 
6. Run the model and export array of values corresponding to different combinations 
of strategies to Microsoft Excel 
7. Repeat the previous step for instantiation of each risk factor to the extreme states 
8. Analyze the results and select optimal combination of strategies satisfying the ob-
jective function 
9. Validate the model output involving stakeholders 
4 Simulation Study 
We demonstrate our proposed method through a simple supply network [11] as shown 
in Fig. 2. The model was developed in GeNIe software. The supply network compris-
es a raw material source, two manufacturers, a warehouse and retailer. Risks are rep-
resented by oval shaped nodes whereas resulting losses and control strategies are 
represented by diamond and rectangular shaped nodes respectively. Each risk factor is 
represented by a unique number appearing at top of the node. Though each domain of 
the supply network may comprise a number of triggers, risk events and consequences, 
we consider limited risks for the sake of simplicity. Furthermore, we consider the 
significance of losses and mitigation strategies at the interface of different domains. 
However, it is equally important to consider internal risks and related mitigation strat-
egies in managing supply chain risks.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Bayesian network based model of a supply network (adopted from Garvey et al. [11]) 
Each control node comprises three states; no mitigation strategy, preventive strate-
gy and reactive strategy. (Conditional) probability values of risks (given no mitigation 
strategy) for the network are shown in Table 1. Loss values and costs associated with 
each strategy are shown in Table 2. We also assume that under standard configura-
WLRQµQRPLWLJDWLRQVWUDWHJ\¶Ls selected for all the control nodes. Conditional proba-
bility values of risks (given preventive or reactive strategy) are given as follows: 
Raw Material Source  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Retailer 
 
 
 
 
Warehouse- 
Retailer 
Warehouse  
 ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܶݎݑ݁ሺܶሻȁݏݐݎܽݐ݁݃ݕ ൌ ܲݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? (6) 
 ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܨ݈ܽݏ݁ሺܨሻȁݏݐݎܽݐ݁݃ݕ ൌ ܲݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? (7) 
 ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܶȁݏݐݎܽݐ݁݃ݕ ൌ ܴ݁ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁ሻ ൌ ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܶȁݏݐݎܽݐ݁݃ݕ ൌ ܰ݋ሻ (8) 
 ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܨȁݏݐݎܽݐ݁݃ݕ ൌ ܴ݁ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁ሻ ൌ ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܨȁݏݐݎܽݐ݁݃ݕ ൌ ܰ݋ሻ (9) 
Table 1. (Conditional) probability values (ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܨȁ݌ܽݎ݁݊ݐݏሻ ൌ  ? െ ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܶȁ݌ܽݎ݁݊ݐݏሻ ܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏ ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇ȁ݌ܽݎ݁݊ݐݏሻ 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
R1 R2 R3 R4 T T T T T T 
    0.4      
T     0.8     
F     0.3     
      0.2    
       0.3   
 T  T     0.7  
 T  F     0.4  
 F  T     0.6  
 F  F     0.1  
 T T       0.9 
 T F       0.6 
 F T       0.5 
 F F       0.2 
 ܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏ ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇ȁ݌ܽݎ݁݊ݐݏሻ R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 
R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R12 T T T T T T 
       0.4      
  T    T  0.8     
  T    F  0.3     
  F    T  0.6     
  F    F  0.2     
T T  T      0.9    
T T  F      0.5    
T F  T      0.6    
T F  F      0.3    
F T  T      0.4    
F T  F      0.3    
F F  T      0.3    
F F  F      0.2    
          0.4   
    T T      0.9  
    T F      0.7  
    F T      0.6  
    F F      0.2  
            0.2 
Table 2. Loss values and costs for different mitigation strategies 
Risk 
Loss (no 
mitigation 
strategy) 
Loss (preventive 
strategy) [Cost] 
Loss (reactive 
strategy) [Cost] 
R2 500 500 [300] 250 [100] 
R5 100 100 [70] 50 [30] 
R6 220 220 [130] 110 [70] 
R9 940 940 [600] 470 [300] 
R11 30 30 [25] 15 [10] 
4.1 Problem Statement 
Given different options of preventive and reactive strategies and associated costs 
available at different nodes of the supply network, what is the optimal combination of 
these strategies yielding maximum improvement in the network expected loss taking 
into consideration the associated mitigation cost? 
Objective Function. In this study, we aim to maximize the improvement in network 
expected loss keeping in view the costs associated with different mitigation strategies. 
 ܧܮሺܺఊ೉ೄ಴ ሻ െ ܧܮሺܺఊೣೞ ሻ െ ܥఊೣೞఊೣೞאఊ೉ೄ௠௔௫  (10) 
where ߛ௑ೄ಴ is the combination of different states of ݊ mitigation strategies under 
standard configuration ߛ௑ೄis a set of all possible orderings of different states of ݊ mitigation strategies ሺݔ௦భ ൈ ݔ௦మ ൈ ǥൈ ݔ௦೙ሻ  ܥఊೣ ೞ  is the cost of implementing ߛ௫ೞ  combination of mitigation strategies 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
Once the Bayesian network was updated, array of network expected loss values was 
exported to Microsoft Excel. Because of availability of three options at each of the 
five control nodes, there were 243 different combinations of control strategies. Under 
standard configuration with no mitigation strategy selected at any control node, the 
network expected loss was 747.52 units. Risk measures of all risk factors are shown 
in Table 3. Risk spectrum representing the graphical dimension of risk measures is 
shown in Fig. 3. R9 is the most important risk factor having maximum values of 
LPCM and LPSM. As risk factors appearing at the interface of different supply net-
work domains were considered important in our model, and therefore assigned loss 
values and control strategies, high values of LPCM and LPSM could be observed for 
all these risk factors. If other risk factors were also assigned loss values, the resulting 
risk measures would be higher in magnitude. Furthermore, external risk triggers af-
fecting multiple organizations within the network would also result in achieving high 
values of the risk measures. Without considering the cost factor, it seems viable to 
implement a control strategy for mitigating R9, however, it might not be feasible after 
capturing dynamics of all significant factors. 
Table 3. Risk measures of risk factors under standard configuration 
Risk  
Standard Configuration 
Expected Loss 
(True) 
Expected Loss 
(False) LPCM LPSM 
R1 963.72 603.39 0.1928 0.4820 
R2 1107.85 387.19 0.4820 0.9641 
R3 834.42 725.80 0.0291 0.1453 
R4 834.21 710.37 0.0497 0.1657 
R5 1053.26 567.96 0.2402 0.6492 
R6 1068.74 473.88 0.3661 0.7958 
R7 760.79 738.68 0.0118 0.0296 
R8 871.34 687.09 0.0808 0.2465 
R9 1431.92 352.66 0.5282 1.4438 
R10 753.40 743.60 0.0052 0.0131 
R11 964.46 518.39 0.3065 0.5967 
R12 812.38 731.31 0.0217 0.1085 ܧܮሺܺሻ 747.52   
 
Fig. 3. Risk spectrum of the supply network under standard configuration 
Network expected loss is an important parameter that reflects the risk level of the 
supply network under given conditions. Variation of network expected loss with all 
combinations of control strategies is shown in Fig. 4. Generally, network expected 
loss decreases with the increase in mitigation cost. However, corresponding to differ-
ent cost regimes, it might not be viable to implement costly strategies because of the 
interdependent nature of these strategies with risks across the network. For each cost 
value, the optimal combination of strategies is represented by a solid circle whereas 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12
LPCM
LPSM
hollow circles represent inefficient solutions. This model helps in identifying ineffi-
cient solutions as well. 
 
Fig. 4. Variation of network expected loss with different combinations of risk mitigation strate-
gies and associated cost 
 
Average LPCM is a measure of relative percentage improvement in the network 
expected loss with the overall average improvement in the state of each risk factor. 
Average LPCM decreases with the increase in mitigation cost as shown in Fig. 5. It 
means that because of the implementation of control strategies, the risk condition of 
individual risk factors improves and therefore, the relative margin of improvement for 
the network expected loss is reduced. Each combination of control strategies repre-
senting minimum value of average LPCM corresponding to specific mitigation cost is 
shown in solid circle. Implementing preventive strategies at all control nodes of the 
network results in achieving average LPCM of 0 at the cost of 1125 units. It is also 
interesting to observe wide variation of optimal points with the increase in mitigation 
cost. 
Average LPSM is a measure of relative percentage variation in the network ex-
pected loss with the overall average variation in the state of each risk factor. In gen-
eral, average LPSM also decreases with the increase in mitigation cost as shown in 
Fig. 6. In case of implementing reactive strategies, LPSM decreases as the resulting 
loss is reduced, however, choice of a preventive strategy reduces the probability of 
risk event without affecting the value of resulting loss and therefore, LPSM is not 
reduced. It can be observed that average LPSM starts increasing after a certain value 
of mitigation cost (approx. 640 units) because of incorporating preventive strategies 
in the portfolio of mitigation strategies.  Each combination of control strategies repre-
senting minimum value of average LPSM corresponding to specific mitigation cost is 
shown in solid circle. Similar to the case of average LPCM, it is also interesting to 
observe wide variation of optimal points with the increase in mitigation cost. 
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 Fig. 5. Variation of average LPCM with different combinations of control strategies and asso-
ciated cost 
 
Fig. 6. Variation of average LPSM with different combinations of control strategies and associ-
ated cost 
 
As our objective function necessitated selection of an optimal combination of 
strategies resulting in the maximum value of relative improvement of network ex-
pected loss taking into account the associated cost of mitigation strategies, it is im-
portant to consider the variation of this function with different combinations of con-
trol strategies as shown in Fig. 7. The graph reveals that the maximum value of objec-
tive function is achieved at the mitigation cost of 300 units. However, there are two 
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other inefficient solutions and without the help of this modelling technique, the rela-
tive impact of each specific combination of strategies might not be appreciated. Com-
binations of optimal and inefficient strategies are presented in Table 4. It is interest-
ing to find that one of the inefficient solutions requires implementing a strategy at the 
most important risk factor R9, however, keeping in view the interdependency between 
different factors, such a solution is not viable.  Furthermore, it is important to consider 
that a decision maker might not treat the expected loss and mitigation cost equally in 
evaluating the optimal choice of strategies. Expected loss may be assigned more 
weightage keeping in view the reputational risks and other non-monetary factors. 
 
Fig. 7. Cost and benefit analysis of various mitigation strategies 
Table 4. Combinations of optimal and inefficient strategies  
Risk Portfolio of Risk Mitigation Strategies Optimal Inefficient 1 Inefficient 2 
R2 Reactive No Preventive 
R5 Preventive No No 
R6 Preventive No No 
R9 No Reactive No 
R11 No No No ܧܮሺܺሻ 357.62 575.56 387.26 
Total Cost 300 
 
Risk measures of all risk factors under contingency configuration are shown in Ta-
ble 5 and risk spectrum representing the graphical dimension of risk measures is 
shown in Fig. 8. As preventive strategies were implemented at R5 and R6, their 
LPCM values are 0. LPCM and LPSM values for R3 and R4 are all 0 because their 
impact is blocked by their descendant nodes. Although no mitigation strategy is im-
plemented at R9, its LPCM and LPSM values have decreased because of the impact 
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of strategies implemented at R5 and R6. R9 still remains a critical risk factor, howev-
er, keeping in view the relative costs of implementing strategies, it is not viable to 
protect this node. 
Table 5. Risk measures of risk factors under contingency configuration 
Risk 
Contingency Configuration 
Expected 
Loss (True) 
Expected 
Loss (False) LPCM LPSM 
R1 432.62 307.62 0.0669 0.1672 
R2 482.62 232.62 0.1672 0.3344 
R3 357.62 357.62 0.0000 0.0000 
R4 357.62 357.62 0.0000 0.0000 
R5 615.36 357.60 0.0000 0.3448 
R6 672.86 357.59 0.0000 0.4218 
R7 364.48 353.05 0.0061 0.0153 
R8 421.65 326.37 0.0418 0.1275 
R9 1088.45 135.83 0.2967 1.2744 
R10 363.98 353.38 0.0057 0.0142 
R11 527.93 213.83 0.1924 0.4202 
R12 391.16 349.24 0.0112 0.0561 ܧܮሺܺሻ 357.62   
 
Evaluation of risk mitigation strategies through our proposed approach results in an 
optimal mix of preventive and reactive strategies. As our approach incorporates inter-
dependency between supply network elements, risks and mitigation strategies and 
follows rigorous technique of BBNs, the resulting solution can be considered as via-
ble. However, it is assumed that all the stakeholders would be willing to share their 
private information and furthermore, elicited values would truly reflect the real-time 
risk scenario. Besides the limitations associated with modelling huge supply net-
works, these assumptions are deemed as challenges to our proposed approach.    
4.3 Managerial Implications 
The proposed modelling approach can help supply chain managers visualize interde-
pendency between supply chain risks across the supply network. Stakeholders can 
identify important triggers and risk events and evaluate the impact of different risk 
mitigation strategies on the entire web of interconnected risks. Furthermore, if stake-
holders consider only their domain of the supply network, they might implement 
strategies yielding sub-optimal solutions and therefore, it is extremely important to 
involve all stakeholders in this modelling process for achieving the global optimal 
solution. Causal mapping (qualitative modelling of BBNs) is beneficial to the manag-
ers in identifying important risks and understanding the dynamics between these risks. 
It is also important to realize that crucial decision of selecting an optimal mix of pre-
ventive and reactive strategies can only be made after following the proposed rigorous 
approach of modelling interdependency between risks and mitigation strategies. 
 
Fig. 8. Risk spectrum of the supply network under contingency configuration 
5 Conclusion and Future Research 
Generally, available models in the field of Supply chain risk management address 
specific problems, whereas, few models capturing interdependency between risks do 
not cover all stages of risk management process. We have bridged this important re-
search gap and proposed a new approach of modelling interdependency between risks 
and evaluating different control strategies (preventive and reactive). Optimal combi-
nation of strategies can only be selected after adopting a rigorous modelling approach 
of capturing supply network configuration, probabilistic interdependency between 
risks, resulting losses and costs associated with different risk mitigation strategies. 
Our proposed risk measures are easy to compute and reflect the contribution of risk 
factors towards the network expected loss. We have also demonstrated use of our 
proposed method through a simple simulation study. 
Our model is based on a number of assumptions. Firstly, the method may be feasi-
ble for a limited network and in case of a large network, elicitation of (conditional) 
probability values may be cumbersome. However, this problem can be tackled with 
introducing some assumptions in the model itself like Noisy-OR function. Secondly, 
we assume that stakeholders would be willing to share true information of the risks 
and loss values, however, it might not be in the best interest of stakeholders to share 
private information and therefore, they would need to be incentivized for developing 
the model and sharing real data.  
We have also assumed binary states for all the risk factors. However, future re-
search may focus on representing risks by continuous variables. Furthermore, a con-
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trol strategy may also be represented by a continuum of control levels and associated 
costs. Our proposed method can help researchers develop robust models for managing 
supply chain risks. Supply chain managers can visualize the interaction between dif-
ferent risks and appreciate the importance of key risk factors. In future, the proposed 
method may be applied in modelling real supply networks in order to evaluate its 
efficacy. 
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